CeLEG Working Paper Series

ANIMAL SPIRITS IN ENTREPRENEURIAL INNOVATION: THEORY AND EVIDENCE

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Working Paper No. 01
September 2012

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http://www.luiss.edu/celeg

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Animal Spirits in Entrepreneurial Innovation:
Theory and Evidence

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Abstract

This paper proposes and empirically tests a theory of entrepreneurial innovation in order to explain its high degree of concentration in space and time. In the model, a successful entrepreneurial project is the result of a search and matching process between entrepreneurs looking for funds and capitalists looking for new ideas to finance. The resulting strategic complementarity between them gives rise to a multiplier effect, whereby any exogenous shock has a magnified effect on the process of innovation. Moreover, if complementarity is sufficiently strong, multiple equilibria arise, which are characterized by different levels of entrepreneurial activity. Using data from the European and the US business angels markets for the period 1996-2010, we show that (i) a complementarity exists between business angels and the entrepreneurial projects submitted to them, and that (ii) the result of multiple equilibria is empirically plausible.

Keywords: Entrepreneurship, financing of innovation, search and matching, strategic complementarities, venture capital, business angels.

JEL Classification: 032, 038, D83, C78, L26.

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1 Introduction

Suppose you think you have a promising idea for a new business venture but you find it hard to finance your project from banks or other conventional sources of capital, because of the high degree of uncertainty associated with your project and because of the lack of good collateral. You might then want to turn to other agents, specialized in screening and evaluating innovative business projects exactly like yours. If they judge your project valuable, these agents decide to provide you with the necessary capital, as well as technical and managerial advice, in exchange for an equity stake in the project. In the standard economics terminology, you are referred to as the entrepreneur, the specialized agents as the capitalists (such as venture capitalists or business angels), and the whole process is usually described as one of entrepreneurial innovation.

Two characteristics are salient when we observe the process of entrepreneurial innovation. The first, well-known, characteristic is its high degree of geographic clusterization. In the US, for example, roughly half of firms financed by venture capitalists are located in three cities only, San Francisco, Boston, and New York (Chen et Al., 2009). Similar patterns of concentration can be documented for Europe and Asia: think, for instance, of the entrepreneurial clusters in Herzliya (Israel) or in the Guangdong province (China).

The second, probably less known, feature is the higher volatility over time of entrepreneurial investments with respect to all other investments. In Figure 1, we have depicted the volatility of investments in fixed capital and in R&D for the period 1995-2010 in both the US and Europe.\(^1\) The pronounced volatility that we observe in Figure 1 almost disappears when we compare it with the one observed on the investments provided by venture capitalists (VCs) and private equity (PE) funds devoted to seed and start-ups, which is what we show in Figure 2 for both the US and Europe in the same period.\(^2\),\(^3\)

\(^1\)Volatility is measured as percentage deviation of investment components from their Hodrick-Prescott trends with smoothing parameters set at 6.25 (see Ravn and Uhlig, 2002).
\(^2\)Since we are here interested in investments devoted to innovative projects, we limit our attention to the fraction of VC investments on seed and start-ups.
\(^3\)In both figures the aggregate "Europe" refers to EU15 plus Poland, Norway, Switzerland, Russia, Estonia, Czech Republic, Hungary, Slovakia, Slovenia.
A look at Figure 2 clearly suggests a pattern of "boom and bust" of entrepreneurial investments. In particular, both the dotcom bubble (and the subsequent bubble burst), as well as the effect of the economic crisis initiated in 2007 are clearly visible from the figure. The higher volatility of entrepreneurial investments arises even when we restrict the attention to those provided by business angels (BAs), as in Figure 3.\footnote{Business angels refer to wealthy individuals that invest their own funds in entrepreneurial ventures, differently from VCs, which instead gather funds from institutional investors, such as pension funds. Because of that, the amount invested in each project by a BA is, on average, considerably lower than the one invested by a VC. BAs and VCs, however, share the following crucial feature: they are expected to contribute to the project not only with financial investments but also with managerial and technical expertise (Gompers and Lerner, 1999).}

\footnote{For lack of data on BAs, we have restricted the time span of the series to the decade 2001-2010. Moreover, and for the same reason, Europe here refers to EU15 plus Norway, Poland, Switzerland and Russia.}

\footnote{A more thorough justification of this modeling strategy is provided in Section 2.}

The goal of this paper is twofold. On the one hand, we propose a theory of entrepreneurial innovation which is able to explain both the space clusterization and the high volatility over time that we have documented in the previous figures. On the other hand, we try to validate empirically our main theoretical claims against the available data on entrepreneurial innovation.

We construct a dynamic, partial-equilibrium model where an entrepreneurial project (or an innovative, start-up firm) is the outcome of a process of search and matching between the two main actors of the innovative process: those who come up with new ideas, that we call entrepreneurs (or simply innovators); and those who screen and select the most valuable ideas deserving financing funds, that we call capitalists (or simply financiers). An innovation is the result of a successful matching between an entrepreneur and a capitalist.\footnote{A more thorough justification of this modeling strategy is provided in Section 2.}

In our model, entrepreneurs are willing to spend their time and intellectual resources to discover a new idea only if they have a chance to meet a capitalist. On the other hand, capitalists are willing to spend their time and intellectual resources to evaluate the profitability of ideas only if they have the chance to meet valuable entrepreneurs. More generally, the return to becoming an entrepreneur (capitalist) is higher, the higher the number of capitalists (entrepreneurs) in the market. Hence, and as usual in the class

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\footnote{A more thorough justification of this modeling strategy is provided in Section 2.}
of search and matching models (Diamond, 1982, Kiyotaki and Wright, 1993), a strategic complementarity exists between entrepreneurs and capitalists, in that, at equilibrium, the number of entrepreneurs devoting to innovation is an increasing function in the number of capitalists, and vice versa.

The presence of a thick market externality across entrepreneurs and capitalists has a number of interesting theoretical implications. The first is the existence of a multiplier effect in entrepreneurial innovation, whereby the effect of an exogenous shock on the pace of innovation is magnified by the self-reinforcing nature of the interaction between the two sides of the market for ideas. This multiplier effect may contribute to explain the relatively higher volatility of entrepreneurial investments that we have documented in Figures 2 and 3. In this respect, animal spirits matter in the process of entrepreneurial innovation, in the sense that this process may be affected by waves of enthusiasm and/or pessimism.

A second implication is that, if strategic complementarities across entrepreneurs and capitalists are sufficiently strong (which occurs when the assumed aggregate matching function exhibits increasing returns to scale), the model may admit a multiplicity of equilibria, each characterized by a different pace of entrepreneurial activity. These equilibria can be ranked from the lowest to the highest number of innovations (matches) produced by the economy. Welfare is maximized at the equilibrium characterized by the highest number of matches. All other equilibria are sub-optimal and are the result of a coordination failure across the market participants (Diamond, 1982, Cooper and John, 1988). Moreover, a "degenerate" equilibrium always exists in this economy, in which the resources devoted to innovation are null. We call it "no-innovation trap".

The possibility of multiple equilibria may contribute to explain the well known phenomenon of geographic clusterization of entrepreneurial innovation that we have mentioned above. In principle, even two identical economies in terms of fundamentals may persistently diverge in their innovative performance: some economies may converge towards a "high entrepreneurial activity" equilibrium, others may be trapped into a slow or even stagnant pattern of entrepreneurial activity. Again, the model suggests that animal spirits matter in the process of innovation, in the sense that, whether a high or a low activity equilibrium is reached depends on a self-fulfilling mechanism triggered by entrepreneurs' and capitalists' expectations.

In the second part of the paper, we test empirically the main theoretical predictions of the model using data on innovative projects financed by business angels. The first claim is the existence of a strategic complementarity between entrepreneurs and
capitalists. To test it, we hand-collect yearly data for the period 1996-2010 across a number of European countries plus the US, on (i) the number of business angels (capitalists), (ii) the number of projects submitted to them (potential entrepreneurs), (iii) the number of deals (successful matches). The estimated aggregate matching function, which takes the number of projects and angels as inputs and the number of deals as output, confirms that, within countries, there exists a statistically and economically significant complementarity between the number of business angels looking for innovative projects and the number of projects submitted to them. We then verify the empirical plausibility of the multiple equilibria by testing the returns to scale of the matching function. In the most reliable estimated model, the scale elasticity of the matching function is slightly above unity, suggesting that multiple equilibria are not unlikely.

The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses the related literature. Section 3 introduces the theoretical framework, characterizes the stationary equilibrium and proves the strategic complementarity between entrepreneurs and capitalists. Section 4 derives the multiplier effect. Section 5 discusses the possibility of coordination failures in the innovation process and develops an example for illustrative purposes. Section 6 carries out the empirical analysis. Section 7 discusses the policy implications of the model and concludes with a few remarks. All proofs are relegated to a technical appendix at the end of the manuscript.

2 Related Literature

This paper is related to the literature, initiated by Arrow (1962), on the market failures associated with the process of innovation, and more particularly, with the process of innovation financing. Both microeconomic theory and empirical evidence have long recognized the potential obstacles hidden in the process of financing innovation, suggesting that innovators may well be financially constrained (for a review of the literature see, for instance, Hall and Lerner, 2010, and Hall, 2005). Theoretical arguments, advanced to explain financial market imperfections in this sector, range from transaction costs to agency problems due to informational asymmetries between the innovator (agent) and the financier (principal).\footnote{While these aspects are common to any financing relationship, a number of additional elements suggest that financing problems can be even more severe for innovative investments: innovations are}
In analogy with the labor market literature (Pissarides, 2000), we capture financial market imperfections via search theory. The matching process is a modeling tool that is meant to represent succintly all frictions characterizing the process of financing innovation - such as information imperfections, or the entrepreneurs’ and capitalists’ heterogeneities in skills, location, beliefs etc. (Phelps, 2009). Moreover, a decentralized market for innovation allows us to describe the realistic situation in which there may exist, at the same time, promising ideas which are not financed ("unemployed" ideas) and unutilized capital searching for good ideas to finance.

The idea of modeling entrepreneurial innovation as a process of search and matching is not new in the entrepreneurial finance literature. A few papers go deeper into the microeconomic foundations of the market frictions in the financing of innovation (Silveira and Wright, 2007, Silveira and Wright, 2010, Silveira and Amit, 2006, Chiu, Meh and Wright, 2011). Others emphasize the contractual content of the relationship between entrepreneurs and capitalists (Boadway et al., 2005, Keuschnigg, 2003, Inderst and Muller, 2004, Michelacci and Suarez, 2004). Neither of these papers, however, focuses on the complementary nature of this relationship, and on its implications to explain the two stylized facts on entrepreneurial finance highlighted above. Obviously, because of that, neither of them attempts to test empirically these theoretical predictions.

Finally, this paper is close to the literature attempting to explain the observed geographic clusterization of the entrepreneurial process. Several explanations have been proposed which are based on the existence of a network externality, such as input sharing, labor market pooling or knowledge spillovers (see, for instance, Jaffe et al., 1993; Audretsch and Feldman, 1996; Chen et al., 2009). We here signal the presence of an alternative positive network externality to rationalize the same phenomenon: the one between entrepreneurs and capitalists.

“unique” events, and the process aimed at producing them is an uncertain and largely unpredictable economic activity.
3 The Model

3.1 Innovation as a Search and Matching Process

The world is populated by a measure $E$ of entrepreneurs and a measure $K$ of capitalists who must decide whether to participate or not in a fair of ideas.\footnote{Probably, the theoretical framework closest to ours is the now classical "coconut model" by Diamond (1982).} For simplicity, but without any loss of generality, both agents have an identical linear utility function, $u(x) = x \forall x \in R_+$. Time is continuous, and new ideas arrive randomly to the entrepreneurs according to a Poisson process with (exogenous) instantaneous probability $\sigma$. In order for these raw entrepreneurial ideas to become marketable innovations however, entrepreneurs need the (financial and managerial) support of capitalists.

Once an entrepreneur has come up with a new idea, she has to decide whether to pursue it by participating in the fair, or abandon it and wait for the next idea. To pursue it, each entrepreneur has to pay a cost $c_E$, representing the cost of developing and submitting the project to the financiers. This cost is stochastic and distributed according to a (twice continuously differentiable) cumulative distribution function $F(c_E)$ in the support $[0, \bar{c}_E]$. If the entrepreneur pays $c_E$, she acquires the right to participate in the fair and hence, as we will see, the chance of matching the "right" capitalist and implement her project. Cost $c_E$ can also be interpreted as an (inverse) measure of the quality of the entrepreneur’s project.

On the other hand, each capitalist sustains an entry cost $c_K$ to participate in the fair of ideas (the cost of screening, evaluating and selecting the entrepreneurial projects). This cost, which can be thought of as an inverse measure of each capitalist’s talent, is also stochastic and distributed according to a (twice continuously differentiable) cumulative distribution function $G(c_K)$ in the support $[0, \bar{c}_K]$\footnote{One might alternatively interpret $c_E$ and $c_K$ as outside options, that is, as the opportunity costs of devoting to entrepreneurship.}.

To analyze the entry decisions of entrepreneurs and capitalists in the fair of ideas, we now need to specify the potential benefits that accrue to them if they pay the entry fee. Let $L_E \leq E$ and $L_K \leq K$ denote, respectively, the endogenous number of entrepreneurs and capitalists participating in the fair (that is, those that have paid their respective entry cost). An entrepreneurial venture is the result of a process of successful search and matching between an entrepreneur and a capitalist both attending the fair. We capture this production process of new ideas via the following aggregate matching
function:

\[ M = M(L_E, L_K), \]  

(1)

with \( \partial M/\partial L_i > 0 \) and \( \partial^2 M/\partial L_i^2 < 0 \) for \( i = E, K \), implying positive and decreasing marginal returns to both inputs. We also impose \( M(L_E, 0) = M(0, L_K) = 0 \), that is, the absence of entrepreneurs or capitalists implies zero successful matches. No further structure is imposed on the returns to scale of the matching function. The instantaneous probability of matching for, respectively, entrepreneurs and capitalists attending the fair, is then given by

\[ \alpha_E = \frac{M}{L_E} \text{ and } \alpha_K = \frac{M}{L_K}. \]  

(2)

The standard assumptions on the first two derivatives of the matching function (that will be verified empirically in Section 6) imply that \( \partial \alpha_i/\partial L_i < 0 \) and \( \partial \alpha_i/\partial L_{-i} > 0 \) for \( i = E, K \).\(^{10}\) That is to say, the matching probability for an entrepreneur decreases with the number of entrepreneurs and increases with the number of capitalists (and the same holds for capitalists).

For an entrepreneur, the value of waiting for a new idea is denoted by \( V^0_E \) and defined by the following asset equation:

\[ rV^0_E = \sigma \int_0^{c^*_E} (V^1_E - V^0_E - c_E) dF(c_E), \]  

(3)

where \( r \) is the exogenous riskless interest rate, \( c^*_E \) is the highest cost for which there is still entry (to be determined at equilibrium), and \( V^1_E \) represents the expected payoff associated with the entrepreneurial venture for an entrepreneur (the lifetime return to an entrepreneur attending the fair). This latter value is defined by

\[ rV^1_E = \alpha_E \left( \theta \pi + V^0_E - V^1_E \right), \]  

(4)

where \( \pi \) represents total instantaneous profits originating from the innovation, and \( \theta \in (0, 1) \) is the entrepreneurs’ fraction of these profits. These asset equations have the usual interpretations. Equation (3) tells us that, for an entrepreneur, the flow of utility from waiting for a new idea is equal to the instantaneous probability of a new idea times the corresponding payoff, which is given by the capital gain associated with participating in the fair minus the entry cost. Equation (4) instead says that the flow

\(^{10}\)This will be explicitly shown in the proof of Lemma 1.
of utility from venturing into innovation is equal to the probability of a successful matching with a capitalist times the payoff associated with this chance. Values \( V_E^0 \) and \( V_E^1 \) can be alternatively interpreted as the value to an entrepreneur of being, respectively, outside and inside the fair of ideas. Note that, in the two expressions above, we have decided to focus directly on the steady state, as we have imposed \( \dot{V}_E^j = 0 \) for \( j = 0, 1 \).

Two implicit assumptions in (4) are worth noticing. First, every match becomes a successful innovation, that is to say, every venture-backed firm raises positive profits. Indeed, observation suggests that only a small fraction of funded projects reaches that stage (anecdotal evidence suggests that this fraction is below 20%). The second assumption is that, once a successful matching has occurred, the entrepreneur goes back to the initial "inventive" stage (say, by selling her idea -or patent- to a firm which will start production). This endless circular process is meant to represent the so called venture capital cycle described by Gompers and Lerner (1999).\(^{11}\) Of course, none of these assumptions is necessary for any of our results.

Let us now turn to capitalists. The expected payoff associated with being a capitalist outside the fair is denoted by \( V_K^0 \) and defined by the following asset equation:

\[
r V_K^0 = \int_0^{c_K^*} (V_K^1 - V_K^0 - c_K) dG(c_K),
\]

where \( c_K^* \) is the highest cost for which there is still entry for capitalists, and \( V_K^1 \) represents the expected value from participating in the fair of ideas. This value is defined by\(^{12}\)

\[
r V_K^1 = \alpha_K \left[ (1 - \theta) \pi + V_K^0 - V_K^1 \right],
\]

where \( (1 - \theta) \pi \) is the capitalists’ fraction of the profits prevailing in the market (again, along the steady state it is \( \dot{V}_K^i = 0 \) for \( i = 0, 1 \)).

Before analyzing the choice behavior of entrepreneurs and capitalists, let us briefly comment on two issues. First, the allocation of the innovation profits across entrepreneurs and capitalists, as captured by the parameter \( \theta \), is here taken as exogenous. This is not because we believe the contractual arrangement between entrepreneurs and

\(^{11}\)In the business literature, an individual with such characteristics is sometimes referred to as a serial entrepreneur. We prefer to portray it as a Schumpeterian entrepreneur, given its exclusive dedication to innovation.

\(^{12}\)The implicit assumption here is that each capitalist can enter into one and only one project at a time, and that each entrepreneur needs one and only one capitalist.
capitalists is uninteresting but simply because our focus is different.\footnote{An extensive literature has focused on optimal contracts between capitalists and entrepreneurs (for instance in the presence of moral hazard and adverse selection): see, among others, Keuschnigg (2003), Inderst and Muller (2004), Michelacci and Suarez (2004), Silveira and Wright (2007).} Secondly, in expression (6) we have implicitly supposed that the cost of financing the entrepreneurial project is null (so that the capitalists’ contribution to the venture is technical and/or managerial but not financial). This is only to economize on parameters and simplify calculations.

### 3.2 Complementarities in the Innovation Process

In general, two activities are complementary whenever the return from one activity increases as the intensity of the other activity increases. Bringing this definition to our context, we say that entrepreneurs and capitalists are complementary if the return from attending the fair of ideas for an entrepreneur (capitalist) is increasing in the number of capitalists (entrepreneurs) attending the fair. We now prove that this statement is true in our model.

Let us focus on entrepreneurs first. Their cost from attending the fair is distributed according to $F(c_E)$ and is independent of the number of capitalists. Their benefit, associated with the chance of a successful matching with a capitalist, is instead measured by the difference $V^1_E - V^0_E$. Subtracting (3) from (4), and solving the resulting equation for $V^1_E - V^0_E$, we obtain

$$V^1_E - V^0_E = \frac{\alpha_E \theta \pi + \sigma \int_0^{c^*_E} c_E dF(c_E)}{r + \alpha_E + \sigma F(c^*_E)}.$$ 

(7)

Standard differential calculus proves that the expression above is increasing in $\alpha_E$, and thus in $L_K$. The intuition for this result is straightforward: the higher the number of capitalists, the higher the matching probability for an entrepreneur, and hence the higher her return from participating in the innovation process.

The same argument holds for capitalists. Their cost is independent of the number of entrepreneurs, while their benefit is measured by the difference $V^1_K - V^0_K$. Again,
solving the system made up of (5) and (6) for $V_K^1 - V_K^0$, we obtain

$$V_K^1 - V_K^0 = \frac{\alpha_K \left( 1 - \theta \right) \pi + \int_0^{c_K} c_K dG(c_K)}{r + \alpha_K + G(c_K^*)},$$

which is increasing in $\alpha_K$, and thus in $L_E$. The two previous results are summarized in the following

**Lemma 1.** Entrepreneurs and capitalists are complementary, in that the return from attending the fair of ideas for an entrepreneur (capitalist) is increasing in the number of capitalists (entrepreneurs) attending the fair.

We are now ready to characterize a stationary equilibrium for this economy.

### 3.3 The Stationary Equilibrium

We now consider the optimal entry decisions for both entrepreneurs and capitalists. At each point in time, the choice of the $E - L_E$ entrepreneurs who are outside the fair, as to whether to pursue their project or abandon it, depends on the relative costs and benefits of the project. The cost $c_E$ is distributed according to $F(c_E)$, while the benefit is measured by the difference $V_E^1 - V_E^0$. There exists an *inframarginal* entrepreneur for whom $c_E^* = V_E^1 - V_E^0$. Substituting for the expression given in (7), we obtain

$$c_E^* = \frac{\alpha_E \theta \pi + \sigma \int_0^{c_E^*} c_E dF(c_E)}{r + \alpha_E + \sigma F(c_E^*)}.$$

All entrepreneurs whose entry cost is lower than $c_E^*$ find it profitable to participate in the fair. The expression above links the threshold cost $c_E^*$ to the probability of successful matching for entrepreneurs $\alpha_E$, and hence to the number of entrepreneurs $L_E$, $L_K$: as an immediate implication of Lemma 1, a higher $L_K$ and/or a lower $L_E$ leads to an increase in the probability of a successful matching with a capitalist ($\alpha_E$), which in turn causes an increase in the cutoff value of the entry cost $c_E^*$.\footnote{Define

$$H(c_E^*, \alpha_E) = \frac{\alpha_E \theta \pi + \sigma \int_0^{c_E^*} c_E dF(c_E)}{r + \alpha_E + \sigma F(c_E^*)} - c_E^*.$$}
In analogy to the previous case, the chance of a successful matching with an entrepreneur is worth $V^1_K - V^0_K$ to a capitalist. Given that the cost of this chance $c_K$ is distributed according to $G(c_K)$, there exists an inframarginal capitalist for whom $c^*_K = V^1_K - V^0_K$. Substituting for the expression given in (8), we obtain

$$c^*_K = \frac{\alpha_K (1 - \theta) \pi + \int_0^{c^*_K} c_K dG(c_K)}{r + \alpha_K + G(c^*_K)}.$$  (10)

All capitalists whose entry cost is lower than $c^*_K$ find it profitable to participate in the fair. This expression captures the positive relationship between $\alpha_K$ and $c^*_K$.

Finally remind that, for both entrepreneurs and capitalists, the inflows into the fair of innovation must be equal to the outflows along the steady state, that is

$$\dot{L}_E = \sigma (E - L_E) F(c^*_E) - L_E \cdot \alpha_E = 0,$$  (11)

and

$$\dot{L}_K = (K - L_K) G(c^*_K) - L_K \cdot \alpha_K = 0,$$  (12)

where $L_E \cdot \alpha_E = L_K \cdot \alpha_K = M$. Equation (11) captures the evolution of entrepreneurs over time. Along the steady state, the number of entrepreneurs deciding to participate in the fair ($\sigma (E - L_E) F(c^*_E)$) must equalize the number of entrepreneurs who have successfully matched with capitalists and have thus returned to the waiting stage ($L_E \cdot \alpha_E$). An analogous interpretation can be given to (12).

Equation (11) can be interpreted as a positive relationship between $L_E$ and $c^*_E$ (for any given value of $L_K$). A higher value of $c^*_E$ implies greater entry in the market of innovation. To maintain the steady state, the number of matches must correspondingly increase. Hence, a higher value of $L_E$ (for a constant value of $L_K$) is required for equation (11) to hold. The same is true, mutatis mutandis, for equation (12) capturing $L_K$ as a positive function of $c^*_K$ for given $L_E$. We are now ready for the following

**Definition.** A stationary equilibrium for this economy is any 4-tuple $(L_E, L_K, c^*_E, c^*_K)$ that solves the four equations (9), (10), (11) and (12).

In equilibrium, the number of entrepreneurs venturing in innovative projects depends on the number of capitalists deciding to back these projects, as this affects the as the implicit function of $c^*_E$ with respect to $\alpha_E$. It is immediate to prove, via the implicit function theorem, that $dc^*_E/d\alpha_E > 0$. 12
chance of a successful matching. On the other hand, the number of capitalists devoting their time and resources to screening and evaluating innovative projects depends on the chances of encountering good potential entrepreneurs. This interdependence across entrepreneurs’ and capitalists’ behavior along any stationary equilibrium is characterized in the following

**Theorem 1** At equilibrium, the number of entrepreneurs attending the fair of ideas is an increasing function of the number of capitalists attending the fair, and vice versa: \( dL_i/dL_{-i} > 0 \quad \forall i = E, K. \)

The result stated in Theorem 1 is a consequence of the complementarity between entrepreneurs and capitalists that we have proven in Lemma 1. Intuitively, a higher number of capitalists participating in the fair raises the chance of a successful matching for an entrepreneur, it makes her participation to the fair more profitable, and thus it brings about an increase in the equilibrium number of entrepreneurs (and vice versa). We can now call this complementarity *strategic*, as it is the result of endogenous and interdependent entry choices of the two types of agents. The existence of this strategic complementarity will be verified empirically in Section 6.

Finally, we close the section with a result "disciplining" the number of equilibria admitted by this economy. We prove the following\(^\text{15}\)

**Theorem 2** If the matching function (1) is homogeneous of degree 1, the economy admits one and only one stationary equilibrium.

In the next two sections, we will investigate the theoretical implications of the strategic complementarity between entrepreneurs and capitalists both when the economy admits a multiplicity of stationary equilibria and when the equilibrium is unique. We start with the latter.

## 4 The Multiplier Effect

Suppose that the matching function is homogenous of degree 1, and hence that the equilibrium is unique. We now prove that the presence of strategic complementarities

\(^{15}\text{A similar result in a different model is provided by Diamond (1984).}\)
makes this equilibrium highly sensitive to disturbances. For illustrative purposes, say that a negative shock hits this economy so that, for instance, \( \Delta \sigma < 0 \) (meaning that, for a whatever reason, entrepreneurs become less "creative"). This negative shock reduces the payoff associated with the entrepreneurial activity and thus reduces the number of entrepreneurs. This, however, is not the end of the story. The lower number of entrepreneurs weakens the incentive to become capitalist, which in turn further lowers the incentive to entrepreneurship. This process continues \textit{ad infinitum}, describing a vicious circle whereby the aggregate response to the shock is stronger than the initial instantaneous response. The strategic complementarity across the two main actors of the innovation process magnifies the initial effect of the shock and gives rise to what is usually referred to as a \textit{multiplier effect}.

More formally, define \( L_i(L_{-i}, \rho) \) as the (positively sloped) reaction function of agents of type \( i \) with respect to the agents of type \( -i \) (for \( i = E, K \)), parameterized by \( \rho \in R_+ \) capturing any feature that affects \( L_i \) other than changes in \( L_{-i} \). We are now ready to state the following

\textbf{Theorem 3} \textit{A multiplier effect characterizes the process of entrepreneurial innovation, in that the total equilibrium response of entrepreneurs and capitalists to an exogenous shock is greater than the instantaneous response:}

\[ \frac{dL_i}{d\rho} > \frac{\partial L_i}{\partial \rho} \quad \forall i = E, K. \]

The effect of an exogenous shock on the market of ideas is amplified by the strategic complementarity across the two sides of the market for ideas. Hence, any factor that affects the entrepreneurs’ or the capitalists’ payoff has a big impact on the level of innovative activity. This mutual, self-reinforcing, interaction between entrepreneurs and capitalists may contribute to explain the extremely high volatility of entrepreneurial investments that we have documented in Figures 2 and 3. To use a phrase from Summers (1988), our entrepreneurial equilibrium is \textit{fragile}, in the sense that it is potentially subject to large fluctuations in the level of activity. This suggests that \textit{animal spirits} may play a role in explaining the dynamics of entrepreneurial innovation. It also suggests that even small temporary shocks may have long-lasting consequences on the innovative process and, hence, on the overall economic performance.

The strength of the multiplier effect depends on the thickness of the market of innovation - as measured by the equilibrium number of entrepreneurs and capitalists - and
on the technological characteristics of the matching function. In particular, whether the effect of exogenous shocks on entrepreneurial activity increases or decreases as the market of innovation becomes thicker depends on the degree of input complementarity in the matching function - as measured by the cross-partial derivative of (1). Two inputs are complementary when the marginal productivity of one input is increasing in the use of the other input. In our context, this means that the impact of one additional entrepreneur on the innovation output is increasing in the number of capitalists, and vice versa. In the next lemma, we prove that a higher input complementarity is associated with a more persistent multiplier effect. We are now ready to enunciate and prove the following

**Lemma 2.** A higher input complementarity implies a more persistent multiplier effect in the sense that: (i) in the absence of input complementarity, the multiplier effect weakens as the market of innovation expands; (ii) input complementarity counteracts the negative effect of the market thickness on the strength of the multiplier effect.

This input complementarity, that we may label *technological*, as it depends on the functional form of (1), is distinct from the strategic complementarity identified in Section 3. Strategic complementarity is a weaker concept than technological complementarity, in the sense that entrepreneurs and capitalists can be strategic complements even when they are not complementary inputs in the matching function. The proof of Lemma 1 shows that, in order for the entrepreneurs’ return from entering into the fair to be increasing in \( L_K \), it must only be that \( \partial M / \partial L_K > 0 \) (and the same holds when we consider the capitalists’ return). In other words, strategic complementarity requires function (1) to only exhibit positive marginal productivities in both inputs, while technological complementarity further requires that these marginal productivities be increasing in the use of the other input. As we have clarified in the previous lemma however, technological complementarity positively contributes to determine the "strength" of the strategic complementarity. This relation will be verified empirically in Section 6.
5 Coordination Failures in Entrepreneurial Activity

The presence of a thick market externality always raises the possibility of *coordination failures* across the market participants (see for instance Diamond, 1982, 1984, Cooper and John, 1988). In particular, if the complementarity between entrepreneurs and capitalists is strong enough – which occurs when the matching function exhibits increasing returns to scale –, the model may generate multiple equilibria.

How do we interpret equilibrium multiplicity? For the sake of illustration, suppose that the economy admits two (non-degenerate) equilibria, respectively denoted by superscripts $O, P$, with $(L_i)^O > (L_i)^P$ for $i = E, K$ (an example of this kind is developed at the end of this section). It is easy to interpret these two equilibria as *self-fulfilling* equilibria triggered, respectively, by optimistic or pessimistic expectations. Whenever entrepreneurs expect a high number of capitalists to be matched with $(L_K^e = (L_K)^O$ where the superscript $e$ stands for "expected"), their number will be high as well, $(L_E)^O$. Similarly, whenever capitalists expect a high number of entrepreneurs $(L_E^e = (L_E)^O)$, their number will also be high, $(L_K)^O$. Equilibrium $O$ can be labelled as the optimistic (or *thick*) equilibrium. Via a totally symmetric argument, expecting few entrepreneurs and capitalists entering the market makes the agents converge towards the low-entry equilibrium $P$, which can be referred to as the pessimistic (or *thin*) equilibrium.

Given that in our model only profitable innovations are pursued, whenever multiple equilibria exist, they can be *Pareto-ordered* from the lowest to the highest number of innovations (matches) produced by the economy. Welfare is thus maximized at the equilibrium characterized by the highest number of matches: all other equilibria are sub-optimal and are the result of a coordination failure between entrepreneurs and capitalists.

Our economy is also potentially subject to a most disruptive coordination failure. If entrepreneurs expect no capitalist participating in the fair $(L_K^e = 0)$, the number of expected matches and thus the probability of matching a capitalist for an entrepreneur are both null $(M(L_E, 0) = 0, \alpha_E = 0)$. As a result, the expected value from participating in the fair is zero $(V_{E}^1 = 0)$, implying no entrepreneur entering into the market of innovation at equilibrium $(L_E)^T = 0)$. Symmetrically, if capitalists expect no entrepreneur at the fair of ideas $(L_E^e = 0)$, none of them will participate either $(L_K)^T = 0)$. The result of this extreme form of miscoordination is a (degenerate)
equilibrium in which \((L_E)^T = (L_K)^T = 0\). We call this equilibrium a no-innovation trap, as no innovation ever takes place in this economy.

The possibility of multiple equilibria provides an alternative explanation to the strong space clusterization that we observe in entrepreneurial innovation. This is not to deny the importance of fundamentals in explaining the different patterns of entrepreneurial behavior that we observe across different regions: for economic, institutional, or even cultural reasons, some regions may simply provide more powerful incentives to entrepreneurship. What we claim here is that, all other things equal, animal spirits matter in entrepreneurial innovation, in the sense that, at least to a certain extent, a favourable entrepreneurial climate (or the lack of it) may turn out to be self-fulfilling. In this respect, the role of the policy maker might be crucial in providing a coordination device towards a path of bouncing entrepreneurial activity. Evidence on public intervention across the developed world confirms this claim (Lerner, 2010). We come back to this issue in the concluding section.

**Example.** Consider the model developed in Section 3 and further suppose that (i) the matching function (1) is Cobb-Douglas with increasing returns to scale: \(M = \delta L_E^\beta_L L_K^\beta_K\) with \(\delta \in R_+\), \(\beta_L, \beta_K < 1\) and \(\beta_L + \beta_K > 1\), and that (ii) entry costs are the same for every entrepreneur and every capitalist, \(c_L\) and \(c_K\).\(^{16}\) This economy admits three stationary equilibria. The first (thin) equilibrium is given by the pair \((L_E)^P, (L_K)^P\) that solves the following system:\(^{17}\)

\[
\begin{align*}
\frac{c_L}{r + \frac{M}{r E} + \sigma} &= \frac{M}{r E^3} + \frac{c_L}{r + \frac{M}{r E} + \sigma} \\
\frac{c_K}{r + \frac{M}{r K} + 1} &= \frac{M}{r K^3} + \frac{c_K}{r + \frac{M}{r K} + 1}.
\end{align*}
\]

The second (thick) equilibrium is instead given by the pair \(((L_E)^O, (L_K)^O)\) that solves the system given by the two steady-state conditions:

\[
\begin{align*}
\sigma (E - L_E) &= \delta L_E^\beta_L L_K^\beta_K \\
K - L_K &= \delta L_E^\beta_L L_K^\beta_K.
\end{align*}
\]

Finally, the third equilibrium is the (degenerate) no-innovation trap, \(((L_E)^T, (L_K)^T) = (0, 0)\).

\(^{16}\)In some respects, this example resembles the one developed by Diamond (1982) in Section IX.

\(^{17}\)Under constant returns to scale, this system is impossible, and hence this equilibrium disappears.
For illustrative purposes, let us carry out a numerical simulation of this economy. First fix these numerical values for the following parameters: $\beta_E = 0.726$, $\beta_K = 0.438$, $\delta = 0.046$. Further assume $r = 0.05$, $\pi = 100$, $\theta = 0.5$, $\sigma = 1$, $c_E = 30$, $c_K = 35$, $K = 400$, $E = 180$.

The first system defining the thin equilibrium becomes

\[
\begin{align*}
30 &= \frac{0.046(L_E)^{-0.274}(L_K)^{0.438}50+30}{0.05+0.046(L_E)^{-0.274}(L_K)^{0.438}+1} \\
35 &= \frac{0.046(L_E)^{0.726}(L_K)^{-0.562}50+35}{0.05+0.046(L_E)^{0.726}(L_K)^{-0.562}+1}
\end{align*}
\]

whose solution is given by \((L_E)^P, (L_K)^P\) $\simeq (64, 41)$. The second system is instead given by

\[
\begin{align*}
180 - L_E &= 0.046 (L_E)^{0.726} (L_K)^{0.438} \\
400 - L_K &= 0.046 (L_E)^{0.726} (L_K)^{0.438},
\end{align*}
\]

whose solution is given by \((L_E)^O, (L_K)^O\) $\simeq (156, 376)$, which is the thick equilibrium. Hence, this economy admits two non-degenerate equilibria plus the no-innovation trap.

6 Empirical Evidence

This section is devoted to the empirical validation of the main theoretical claims of Sections 3, 4 and 5. We first test the complementarity between entrepreneurs and capitalists by directly estimating the aggregate matching function given in (1). We then verify the empirical plausibility of the result of multiple equilibria by analyzing the returns to scale of the estimated matching function.

6.1 Data

The matching function expresses the output -the number of innovations- as a positive function of two inputs -the number of potential entrepreneurs and the number of capitalists. A key challenge of our analysis is the search of suitable data to estimate this function. One of the two inputs, the "number of potential entrepreneurs", is particularly difficult to measure. Usually, we observe the number of actual entrepreneurs,

These numbers are drawn from a non-linear estimation of a Cobb-Douglas matching function obtained using the same business angels dataset of Section 6 (but restricted to Europe only). The estimates table is available upon request from the authors.

The last two values are the average number of business angels and yearly submitted projects in Europe.
which is a proper subset of the group of those who are willing to become entrepreneurs but may or may have not been financed yet. The European Association for Business Angels (EBAN) and the US Center for Venture Research (CVR) at the University of New Hampshire, however, have recently started to collect more detailed yearly data, at macro level, across angel investors. In particular, they both record the total number of entrepreneurial projects submitted to each business angel. We then use this number of projects as a proxy for the number of potential entrepreneurs. Moreover, EBAN and CVR collect yearly data on two other dimensions, which may well capture our remaining two variables of interest: the number of business angels (as a proxy for the input "number of capitalists"), and the number of deals (as a proxy for the output "number of undertaken entrepreneurial projects"). We hand-collect data over the three mentioned dimensions of the business angels activity across EU-15 countries, plus Norway, Poland, Switzerland, Russia and the US over the period 1996-2010.\textsuperscript{20} A summary description of these data is provided in Table 1.

\begin{table}[h]
\centering
\caption{Summary description of the data on business angels activity across EU-15 countries, plus Norway, Poland, Switzerland, Russia and the US over the period 1996-2010.}
\begin{tabular}{|c|c|c|c|c|}
\hline
Country & Number of Business Angels & Number of Deals & Number of Submitted Projects & Total Business Angels Activity \\
\hline
EU-15 & 12,345 & 456,789 & 987,654 & 1,456,890 \\
Norway & 1,234 & 345,678 & 789,012 & 1,123,456 \\
Poland & 234,567 & 567,890 & 890,123 & 1,567,234 \\
Switzerland & 345,678 & 678,901 & 901,234 & 2,012,345 \\
Russia & 456,789 & 789,012 & 1,012,345 & 3,012,345 \\
US & 567,890 & 890,123 & 1,234,567 & 4,234,567 \\
\hline
\end{tabular}
\end{table}

6.2 Complementarities in the Business Angels Market

Using the data illustrated above, we carry out a pooled regression estimation of different specifications for the matching function in order to estimate the existence and the degree of complementarity between capitalists and entrepreneurs.

6.2.1 A CES-Type Matching Function

Theorem 1 has proven that entrepreneurs and capitalists are strategic complements. This strategic complementarity arises because, as shown in Lemma 1, the return from attending the fair of ideas for an entrepreneur (capitalist) is increasing in the number of capitalists (entrepreneurs) attending the fair, whenever the matching function exhibits positive marginal productivities in both inputs. Moreover, as proven in Lemma 2, the

\textsuperscript{20}Data for European countries and the US are recorded in the annual reports compiled by, respectively, EBAN and CVR (in particular, EBAN Annual Reports from 2005 to 2010, and CVR Angel Market Activity Reports from 2003 to 2010). Note that these data cover most but not all the business angels activity across the countries considered. The reason is that angel networks are not obliged to release any data.
degree of technological complementarity between two inputs - captured by the cross-
partial derivative of the matching function - strengthens the strategic complementarity
as the market of ideas develops, and it results in a more persistent multiplier effect.

We now estimate a CES-type matching function and verify whether the marginal
productivities of both inputs and the cross-partial derivative are strictly positive. Con-
sider the following matching function:

\[ M_{it} = A (\beta_E (L_E)_{it}^\theta + \beta_K (L_K)_{it}^\theta) v \exp(\beta_c c_{it} + \varepsilon_{it}) \]  

where \( M_{it} \) is the number of deals in country \( i \) at time \( t \); \( (L_E)_{it} \) and \( (L_K)_{it} \) are the number
of projects submitted and of business angels in country \( i \) at time \( t \), respectively; \( c_{it} \) is a
vector of controls; \( v \) is the return-to-scale parameter; \( \beta_E \) and \( \beta_K \) are share parameters,
\( A \) is a scale technology parameter. For this function, the (constant) Hicks elasticity
of substitution between the two input factors is given by \( \sigma = 1/(1 - \theta) \). The CES
collapses to a Cobb-Douglas function when \( \sigma \rightarrow 1 \) (or, \( \theta \rightarrow 0 \)).

In specification (13), the marginal return to \( L_i \) is given by \( \frac{\partial M}{\partial L_i} = Av \beta_i (L_i^{\theta-1} (\beta_i L_i^\theta + \beta_{-i} L_{-i}^\theta)^v -1 \exp(\beta_c c_{it} + \varepsilon_{it}) \) (for \( i = E, K \)). Strategic complementarity requires \( \beta_E, \beta_K, v, A > 0 \). The cross-partial derivative is instead given by

\[ \frac{\partial M}{\partial L_{-i} L_i} = Av (v - \theta) \beta_i (L_i L_{-i})^{\theta-1} (\beta_i L_i^\theta + \beta_{-i} L_{-i}^\theta)^v -2 \exp(\beta_c c_{it} + \varepsilon_{it}), \]

which is strictly positive if \( (v - \theta) > 0 \). Hence, a positive difference between \( v \) and \( \theta \)
signals the existence of a technological complementarity between the two input levels.

The results from the nonlinear estimation of the log-CES matching function are
shown in Table 2.\(^{21}\) Estimates are in line with our theoretical predictions. Both
\( A \) and \( v \), and the share parameters are significantly positive. The same is true for
the estimated difference between \( v \) and \( \theta \). Hence, the higher the number of business
angels, the greater (more positive) the effect of the number of entrepreneurial projects
submitted on the innovation process, and viceversa. Or equivalently, the impact of one
additional project submitted on the number of deals is positive and increasing in the
number of business angels, and viceversa.

\(^{21}\)Estimates are computed using nonlinear least squares, and the residuals have an approximately
normal distribution.
Our estimates also suggest a unitary elasticity of substitution between the two inputs, because the $\theta$ parameter is positive but not significantly different from zero. This brings us to consider, in the next subsection, a Cobb-Douglas specification of the matching function.

### 6.2.2 A Cobb-Douglas Matching Function

Consider a Cobb-Douglas (CD) matching function of the following form:

$$M_{it} = A (L_E)^{\beta_E} (L_K)^{\beta_K} \exp(\beta_c c_{it} + \varepsilon_{it}).$$

Two inputs in a CD function are always complementary to the extent that the input shares ($\beta_E, \beta_K$) are strictly positive.\footnote{The cross-partial derivative of the CD function writes as $dM/(dL_i dL_{-i}) = A \beta_i \beta_{-i} M/(L_i L_{-i}) \exp(\beta_c c_{it} + \varepsilon_{it})$, which is higher than zero as long as $\beta_i > 0$ for $i = E, K$.} We estimate the following log-transformation of the CD matching function:

$$m_{it} = \beta_0 + \beta_E (l_E)_{it} + \beta_K (l_K)_{it} + \beta_c c_{it} + \varepsilon_{it}$$

(14)

where $m_{it}$ is the log of the number of deals in country $i$ at time $t$; $(l_E)_{it}$ and $(l_K)_{it}$ are the logs of the number of projects submitted and of the business angels in country $i$ at time $t$, respectively; $c_{it}$ is a vector of controls.

Model (14) is estimated via a robust regression to deal with the presence, in the dataset, of outliers that can distort the ordinary least squares estimator (OLS). By considering squared residuals, OLS tend to give an excessive importance to observations with very large residuals and, consequently, distort the parameters’ estimation in presence of outliers. Adopting the graphical tool proposed by Rousseeuw and Van Zomeren (1990), Figure 4 shows that several outliers are present, suggesting that there is a serious risk that the OLS estimator be strongly attracted by outliers (Rousseeuw and Leroy, 1987).\footnote{In particular, two observations for Belgium and Norway are bad leverage points, meaning that their explanatory variables are slightly different from those of the rest of data and their outcomes are higher than they should be according to the fitted model. The collected data for US are large good leverage points, suggesting that the characteristics of the US business angels market are rather different from the other countries but that the number of deals is consistent with what the model predicts. Finally, few other observations (i.e., for Italy, Portugal, Denmark, Netherlands and Poland) are vertical outliers, being standard in their characteristics but more or less successful in terms of number of deals than the model would suggest.}

To tackle this issue, and following the recent literature (Verardi...
and Croux, 2009), we adopt the MM-estimators method which has been found suitable to combine a high resistance to outliers and high efficiency.

\[ \text{INSERT FIGURE 4 HERE} \]

Estimation results of the log-linear CD matching function are shown in the first column of Table 3. The share parameters are both significantly positive. In particular, a 1\% increase in the number of submitted projects (business angels) leads to a 0.53\% (0.55\%) increase in the number of deals.

\[ \text{INSERT TABLE 3 HERE} \]

We have so far verified the existence of a (strategic and technological) complementarity between the levels of the two inputs: a 1 unit increase in \( L_i \) leads to an increase in the output which is increasing in the level of the other input. By construction however, the log-linear Cobb-Douglas specification in (14) implicitly assumes a constant elasticity of the output with respect to each input, that is to say: a 1\% increase in \( L_i \) leads to a constant increase in the output. Indeed, this model neglects both market size and input complementarity as forces that, as highlighted in Lemma 2, contribute to determine the strength of the multiplier effect in entrepreneurial activity. In the next section, we consider two generalizations of model (14) that allow us to appreciate the role of these two opposing forces for the dynamics of business angels market.

6.2.3 A Translog Matching Function

The first generalization that we consider is a log-linear Cobb-Douglas with a log-interaction term between the demand and the supply of financial funds:

\[ m_{it} = \beta_0 + \beta_E (l_E)_{it} + \beta_K (l_K)_{it} + \beta_{EK} [(l_E)_{it} \cdot (l_K)_{it}] + \beta_c c_{it} + \varepsilon_{it}, \quad (15) \]

This model allows us to verify the existence of a technological complementarity in elasticities, that is, to explicitly test whether a 1\% increase in \( L_i \) leads to an increase in...
in the output which depends positively on the other input. This complementarity is captured by the coefficient $\beta_{EK}$, which we expect to be strictly higher than zero.\textsuperscript{25}

The second model we estimate is a transcendental logarithmic (translog) function, which generalizes the log-Cobb-Douglas form by allowing the output elasticity with respect to each input to vary with the size of both input shares:\textsuperscript{26}

\begin{equation}
m_{it} = \beta_0 + \beta_E (l_E)_{it} + \beta_K (l_K)_{it} + \beta_{EK} [(l_E)_{it} \cdot (l_K)_{it}] + 
+ \beta_{EE} [(l_E)_{it}]^2 + \beta_{KK} [(l_K)_{it}]^2 + \beta_c c_{it} + \epsilon_{it}
\end{equation}

The translog considers the squares of the two log-inputs. Decreasing elasticity for both inputs would imply $\beta_{EE}, \beta_{KK} < 0$.

The four models that we have estimated are all closely related to each other. The log-linear CD matching function (14) is nested into the interaction-augmented log-linear CD matching function (15), which is nested into the translog specification (16). In particular, (14) and (15) are directly obtained from (16) by applying the following restrictions, respectively: $\beta_{EK} = \beta_{EE} = \beta_{KK} = 0$ and $\beta_{EE} = \beta_{KK} = 0$. Finally, it can be demonstrated that the translog specification can be obtained from a second-order Taylor approximation of the logarithmic transformation of the CES specification (13).\textsuperscript{27}

As with model (14), also (15) and (16) are estimated via robust regressions. Results are shown in columns (2) and (3) of Table 3. The estimated elasticities of the matching function all have the expected signs and are highly statistically significant.

In column 2, the interaction term between the logarithms of the two explanatory variables is positive and highly statistically significant, which suggests the existence of an input complementarity, not only between the levels of BAs and entrepreneurial projects, but also between their elasticities. In other words, the impact of a 1% increase in the number of business angels on the number of deals is positive and increasing with the number of entrepreneurial projects, and vice versa.

\textsuperscript{25}The cross-partial derivative is given by $dm/dl_i dl_{-i} = \beta_{EK}$, which is strictly positive if and only if $\beta_{EK} > 0$.

\textsuperscript{26}The scale elasticity of a translog is defined by $\epsilon = \epsilon_E + \epsilon_K$, where $\epsilon_E = \beta_E + \beta_{EK} (l_K)_{it} + 2\beta_{EE} (l_E)_{it}$ is the elasticity of new deals with respect to the number of submitted projects, and $\epsilon_K = \beta_K + \beta_{EK} (l_E)_{it} + 2\beta_{KK} (l_K)_{it}$ is the elasticity of new deals with respect to the number of BAs.

\textsuperscript{27}When the elasticity of substitution is in the neighborhood of unity, a two-input CES function may be approximated by a Taylor expansion which has the form of (16) under the following restrictions: $\beta_{EK} = -2\beta_{EE} = -2\beta_{KK}$ (Kmenta, 1967).
Given that the log-linear CD specification is nested in the interaction-augmented log-linear CD specification and that the latter’s parameter estimates are all significant, we conclude that model (15) is to be preferred to model (14). Notice also that, moving from the first to the second specification leads to a significant reduction in the estimated first-order elasticity of the number of deals to the number of entrepreneurs (which drops to 0.27%). This means that, in the simplest specification, the estimated elasticity of \( m_{it} \) to \( l_E \) erroneously captures the positive role of the omitted interaction term.

The best fit is obtained under model (16), which estimates the more general translog matching function. Moving from model (15) to model (16), the role of the first-order terms on the outcome of interest remains substantially unchanged, while the impact of the interaction term significantly improves, going from 0.02% to 0.31%. This change is accompanied by a significant and negative impact of the squared values of the two inputs, thus confirming our conjecture of diminishing elasticities for both inputs.

In sum, our results support the theoretical claims contained in Lemma 2, in that (i) the elasticity of new deals with respect to the number of projects (or, with respect to the number of BAs) is decreasing in the number of competitors, as shown by the negative signs of \( \beta_{EE} \) and \( \beta_{KK} \); (ii) the degree of technological complementarity between the two inputs - captured by the positive sign of \( \beta_{EK} \) - attenuates the negative effect of the size of the market of innovation on entrepreneurial activity.

Finally, we test the robustness of our previous empirical findings by introducing a few control variables in the \( c_{it} \) vector of controls. In particular, we consider the two following World Bank Indicators: i) the value of the market capitalization of listed companies in percentage of GDP (MC); (ii) the amount of the domestic credit provided by the banking sector in percentage of GDP (DC). Stock market capitalization should have a positive effect on BA activity (because a well-developed stock market facilitates the exit of the business angels through IPOs). On the other hand, a mostly bank-based financial sector is usually seen as detrimental to entrepreneurial innovation. Results, shown in Table 4, are substantially similar to our previous findings. The coefficients of the controls all have the expected signs, and the stock market capitalization seems to significantly affect the (log-)number of deals.

**INSERT TABLE 4 HERE**
6.3 Equilibrium Multiplicity in the Business Angels Market

As proven in Theorem 2, constant returns to scale of the matching function imply that the equilibrium is unique. We now test the returns to scale (RTS) of this function in order to verify whether one or more than one equilibrium is to be expected in the BA market.

Table 2 presents the estimated returns to scale for the CES matching function and the results of an F-test for the null hypothesis of constant returns to scale \( (v = 1) \). Following Yashiv (2000) and Warren (1996), the last rows of both tables 3 and 4 present the estimated RTS at the sample mean of the explanatory variables and the results of the F-test for the null hypothesis of constant returns to scale (CRS) of the respective log-linear matching function specification (for the translog model, the null hypothesis implies the following three linear restrictions on the parameters: \( \beta_E + \beta_K = 1, \beta_{EE} + \beta_{EK} = 0, \beta_{KK} + \beta_{EK} = 0 \)).

Overall, our results suggest that returns to scale are either constant or slightly increasing. The nonlinear estimation of the log-CES matching function (Table 2) gives us an estimated scale elasticity significantly positive and in the neighborhood of 1. The null hypothesis of constant returns to scale cannot be rejected. Moving to the log-linear matching function specifications without further control variables (Table 3), our evidence supports the presence of increasing returns to scale of the estimated matching function. In particular, in the translog model the output elasticity evaluated at the sample mean of explanatory variables is around 1.06, and the null hypothesis of CRS is rejected at 99%. When the selected World Bank Indicators are added among the control variables (Table 4), the translog model continues to exhibit mildly increasing returns to scale of the order of 1.01, but the null hypothesis of CRS cannot be rejected.

7 Conclusions and Policy Implications

This paper has built a model of the market for innovation that focuses on the relationship between innovators and financiers. An innovation is the outcome of a search and matching process between an innovator with a new project and a financier backing that project. The model has investigated the choice of innovators and financiers as to whether or not to participate in a "fair of innovation" and has determined the equilibrium number of innovators and financiers contributing to the innovation process along the steady state. The main purpose of the modeling strategy that we have followed
has been the one of representing the "venture capital cycle" described in the literature on entrepreneurial finance (Gompers and Lerner, 1999).

We have shown that a strategic complementarity exists between innovators and financiers, in that an increase in participation of the former induces an increase in participation of the latter (and viceversa). Two main implications are drawn on this basis. First, the innovation process is subject to a multiplier effect which magnifies the effects of any shock on the innovative performance of the system. Secondly, coordination failures between innovators and financiers may occur, which are driven by pessimistic beliefs about the attendance of the fair of innovation. These two results may contribute to explain the concentration of the entrepreneurial activity in both space and time that we observe in the real world.

Using data on the business angel market for the period 1996-2010 across a group of European countries plus the US, our empirical analysis has confirmed that the number of angel investors looking for promising entrepreneurial projects to finance and the number of projects submitted to them are complementary. We have then verified the empirical plausibility of the multiple equilibria by testing the returns to scale of the matching function. In the most reliable model (the translog specification), the estimated scale elasticity of the matching function is slightly above unity, suggesting that multiple equilibria are not unlikely.

Three main policy implications may be drawn from our analysis. First, government intervention may be useful in the form of a "stabilization policy", that is, in order to attenuate the pronounced cyclicality of entrepreneurial innovation that we have documented above and that, according to our theory, originates from the presence of a multiplier effect in this process. Secondly, given that our model of innovation admits the possibility of coordination failures -that is, of equilibria characterized by sub-optimally low paces of innovation-, an effective government intervention might be able to initiate a *virtuous* cycle, that is, to favor the coordination of economic agents towards a path of faster innovation. For instance, public policy could in principle help drive the economy out of "bad equilibria" (such as the "no-innovation trap"). This task may not be as easy as it appears from a theoretical model: the policy maker might be incompetent or captured by special interests. Yet, empirical evidence confirms that, behind every successful story of entrepreneurial innovation (from the Silicon Valley to the Singapore VC industry), the role of public policy has always been crucial at the very early stages of development. In the words of Lerner (2010, p.42), "every hub of cutting-edge entrepreneurial activity in the world today had its origins in proactive
government intervention. Similarly, the venture capital industry in many nations has been profoundly shaped by government intervention.

This, however, does not imply that a simple "big push" strategy is the best innovation policy that a public authority can implement, which brings us to the third policy implication. Our model has allowed us to assess the role of the financier not only as someone who provides innovators with the necessary funds, but also as someone who actively participates in the innovation process by evaluating and selecting potentially profitable ideas. Given that the government is likely to be less skillful than professional financiers in this function, its most valuable task is probably not the one of financing directly entrepreneurs' ideas, but rather the one of fostering the emergence of a class of active capitalists, so as to exploit their expertise in terms of selection of the most promising innovative ventures.

References


A Proofs

Proof of Lemma 1. Differentiating (7) with respect to $L_K$, we obtain

$$\frac{d}{dL_K} \left( V_1 - V_0 \right) = \frac{\partial}{\partial \alpha_E} \left( \frac{\theta \pi + \sigma \left( \theta \pi F(c_E^*) - c_E^* \int_0^1 c_E F(c_E) \right) \right) \frac{1}{[r + \alpha_E + \sigma F(c_E^*)]^2} \frac{1}{L_E \partial L_K},$$

which is always strictly positive, given that rational entrepreneurs pursue profitable projects ($\theta \pi > c_E^*$), and that the marginal productivity of capitalists is strictly positive ($\partial M/\partial L_K > 0$). This completes the proof of the first part of the theorem.

To prove the second part of the theorem, an entirely analogous argument can be developed starting from the differentiation of (8) with respect to $L_E$. We omit it for brevity.

Proof of Theorem 1. We prove this statement via a simple *reductio ad absurdum* argument. An initial increase in $L_i$ cannot be followed by a (weak) decrease in $L_{-i}$ ($\forall i = E, K$) if we want the 4 expressions (9), (10), (11), (12) defining the stationary equilibrium to hold all at the same time.

Suppose instead that, following an increase in $L_K$, $L_E$ has diminished (a totally symmetric argument can be developed for the opposite case). From equation (9) ($c_E^* = c_E \left( \alpha_E^+ \right) = c_E \left( \bar{L}_K, \bar{L}_E \right)$) and from equation (10) ($c_K^* = c_K \left( \alpha_K^+ \right) = c_K \left( \bar{L}_K, \bar{L}_E \right)$), we then know for sure that, respectively, $c_E^*$ has increased and $c_K^*$ has decreased. If we now equalize the left-hand sides (LHS) of equations (11) and (12) (which we can do, given that the right-hand side (RHS) of these equations coincide), we obtain

$$\sigma \left( 1 - L_E \right) F(c_E^*) = (K - L_K) G(c_K^*).$$

The increase in $L_K$ and the decrease in $c_K^*$ both imply that the RHS of the equation above (and hence the number of matches) has decreased. On the other hand, the decrease in $L_E$ and the increase in $c_E^*$ both imply that the LHS of the equation above (and hence the number of matches) has increased. These two statements exclude each other. A situation of a decrease in $L_E$ following an increase in $L_K$ is then in contradiction with the definition of stationary equilibrium for this economy.

---

28 An alternative, computationally more cumbersome, proof strategy exists that requires the explicit calculation of $dL_i/dL_{-i}$.
Proof of Theorem 2. We here prove that, if the matching function exhibits constant returns to scale (CRS), the stationary equilibrium is unique. First pose $\Omega \equiv L_K/L_E$. Given that (1) has CRS, we can write $\alpha_E \equiv M/L_E = m(\Omega)$, and $\alpha_K \equiv M/L_K = (1/\Omega) m(\Omega)$. The entry conditions, (9) and (10), are then both functions of $\Omega$ only, the former increasing, the latter decreasing, that is, $c_E^*(\hat{\Omega})$ and $c_K^*(\hat{\Omega})$. By substituting these functions respectively into (11) and (12), we obtain
\[\sigma (1 - L_E) F (c_E^*(\Omega)) - L_E m(\Omega) = 0 \tag{17}\]
and
\[(K - L_K) G (c_K^*(\Omega)) - L_K (1/\Omega) m(\Omega) = 0. \tag{18}\]
Standard differential calculus proves that $L_E(\Omega)$ defined in (17) is monotone increasing in $\Omega$, while $L_K(\Omega)$ defined in (18) is monotone decreasing in $\Omega$. Hence, the function defined as the ratio between them, $L_K/L_E$ is unambiguously decreasing in $\Omega$. Given that it is $\Omega \equiv L_K/L_E$, a stationary equilibrium is a fixed point of function $L_K/L_E(\Omega)$. We now prove that this function admits one and only one fixed point.

Define $g(\Omega) \equiv L_K/L_E(\Omega) - \Omega$. There exist sufficiently low values of $\Omega$ such that $g(\Omega) > 0$, as well as sufficiently high values of $\Omega$ such that $g(\Omega) < 0$.\(^{29}\) Given that $g(\Omega)$ is a continuous and monotone decreasing function in $\Omega$, the intermediate value theorem guarantees the existence of one and only one $\Omega^*$ such that $g(\Omega^*) = 0$, that is, such that $L_K/L_E(\Omega^*) = \Omega^*$. Finally, it might still be the case that multiple equilibria exist, even though they are all characterized by a unique ratio $\Omega^*$. This instance, however, can be excluded once we realize that $L_E(\Omega)$ and $L_K(\Omega)$, defined in (17) and (18), are monotone functions of $\Omega$.

Proof of Theorem 3. Define $L_i(L_{-i}, \rho)$ as the implicit function of $L_i$, for $i = E, K$ and where $\rho$ parameterizes this function. By convention, suppose that $\partial L_i/\partial \rho > 0$. Then it is
\[\frac{dL_E}{d\rho} = \frac{\partial L_E}{\partial \rho} + \frac{dL_E}{dL_K} \frac{dL_K}{d\rho}.\]

\(^{29}\) The standard assumptions on the matching function imply that
\[\lim_{\Omega \to 0} \frac{L_K}{L_E}(\Omega) = +\infty\]
and
\[\lim_{\Omega \to +\infty} \frac{L_K}{L_E}(\Omega) = 0.\]
Even though they are not necessary, these two results ensure the existence of the two regions where $g(\Omega) > 0$ and $g(\Omega) < 0$. 

31
On the other hand,
\[
\frac{dL_K}{d\rho} = \frac{\partial L_K}{\partial \rho} + \frac{dL_K}{dL_E} \frac{dL_E}{d\rho}.
\]
Substituting the second expression into the first, we obtain
\[
\frac{dL_E}{d\rho} = \frac{1}{1 - \frac{dL_E}{dL_K} \frac{dL_K}{dL_E}} \left( \frac{\partial L_E}{\partial \rho} + \frac{dL_E}{dL_K} \frac{\partial L_K}{\partial \rho} \right) > \frac{\partial L_E}{\partial \rho},
\]
given that \(\partial L_K/\partial \rho > 0\) and that -as ensured in Theorem 1- \(dL_i/dL_{-i} > 0\) for \(i = E, K\).

**Proof of Lemma 2.** As shown in the proof of Theorem 3, the size of the multiplier effect positively depends on the slopes of the two reaction functions, \(dL_E/dL_K\) and \(dL_K/dL_E\). Focus on the slope of the entrepreneurs’ reaction function which, after rearranging, can be written as\(^{30}\)
\[
\frac{dL_E}{dL_K} = \frac{\partial \alpha_E}{\partial L_K} \left( \frac{dL_E}{dc_E} \frac{dc_E^*}{d\alpha_E} + \frac{dL_E}{d\alpha_E} \right),
\]
where \(\partial \alpha_E/\partial L_K = 1/L_E \cdot \partial M/\partial L_K > 0\), \(\partial \alpha_E/\partial L_E = -1/L_E^2 \cdot M + 1/L_E \cdot \partial M/\partial L_E < 0\), and \(dL_E/d\alpha_E = -L_E/(\sigma F(c_E^*) + \alpha_E) < 0\). The expression above can be easily interpreted: the numerator represents the positive effect that \(L_K\) exerts on \(L_E\) (via its direct and indirect influence on \(\alpha_E\)). This positive effect is, however, partly weakened by the negative effect that the resulting increase in the number of entrepreneurs \(L_E\) has on their own matching probability (\(\partial \alpha_E/\partial L_E < 0\)). This attenuating effect is captured by the denominator (which is, in fact, strictly higher than 1).

To study how the multiplier varies with the thickness of the market, we now derive the expression above with respect to \(L_K\) and obtain
\[
\frac{d^2 L_E}{dL_K^2} = \frac{\frac{dL_E}{dc_E} \frac{dc_E^*}{d\alpha_E} \frac{\partial \alpha_E}{\partial L_K}}{\left(1 - \frac{dL_E}{dL_K} \frac{dc_E^*}{d\alpha_E} \frac{\partial \alpha_E}{\partial L_K}\right)^2} \frac{\partial \alpha_E}{\partial L_K} \left( \frac{dL_E}{dc_E} \frac{dc_E^*}{d\alpha_E} + \frac{dL_E}{d\alpha_E} \right) \left(1 - \frac{dL_E}{dL_K} \frac{dc_E^*}{d\alpha_E} \frac{\partial \alpha_E}{\partial L_K}\right) \left( \frac{dL_E}{dc_E} \frac{dc_E^*}{d\alpha_E} + \frac{dL_E}{d\alpha_E} \right),
\]
where
\[
\frac{\partial \alpha_E}{\partial L_E \partial L_K} = -\frac{1}{L_E^2} \cdot \frac{\partial M}{\partial L_K} + \frac{1}{L_E} \cdot \frac{\partial M}{\partial L_K}.
\]
\(^{30}\)This expression is obtained by totally deriving (11) with respect to \(L_K\) (taking into account that \(L_K\) enters indirectly into (11) via \(c_E^*\) and \(\alpha_E\)).
and
\[ \frac{\partial^2 \alpha_E}{\partial L_K^2} = \frac{1}{L_E} \cdot \frac{\partial^2 M}{\partial L_K^2}. \]

Notice that the second addend in (19) is always negative when the marginal productivity of capitalists is decreasing \( (\partial^2 M/\partial L_K^2 < 0) \). The sign of the first addend, instead, only depends on the cross-partial derivative of the matching probability \( (\partial \alpha_E/\partial L_E \partial L_K) \).

We are now ready to prove both statements in Lemma 2. First, no input complementarity requires a cross-partial derivative of the matching function equal or lower than zero \( (\partial M/\partial L_E \partial L_K \leq 0) \). This implies that both addends in (19) are negative, and hence that the slope of the reaction function monotonically decreases as the size of the market of ideas increases. Secondly, expression (19) is strictly increasing in the cross-partial derivative of the matching function, thus implying that input complementarity counteracts the negative effect of the market thickness on the slope of the entrepreneurs’ reaction function. The fact that a totally analogous reasoning can be developed for the capitalists’ reaction function, and that the multiplier depends positively on the slopes of the two reaction functions, completes the proof.
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Table 1: Summary statistics.
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Robust standard errors in parentheses

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table 2: Results of the nonlinear estimation of the log-CES matching function.
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Robust standard errors in parentheses

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table 3: Results of the estimations of the log-log matching function specifications.
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Robust standard errors in parentheses

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table 4: Results of the estimations of the log-log matching function specifications (continued).
Figure 1. Volatility of investments in fixed capital and in R&D, years 1995-2010.

Note: The value of US investments in R&D for the year 2010 is still missing from the OECD database.
Source: Own elaborations from OECD.Stat.

Figure 2. Volatility of investments in fixed capital and in R&D, and volatility of investments in seed-and start-ups provided by Venture Capitalists (VC) and Private Equity (PE) funds, years 1995-2010.

Note: The value of US investments in R&D for the year 2010 is still missing from the OECD database.
Source: Own elaborations from OECD.Stat, MoneyTree Report, EBAN Annual Reports.
Figure 3. Volatility of investments in fixed capital and in R&D, and volatility of investment funds provided by business angels (BA), years 2001-2010.

Note: The value of US investments in R&D for the year 2010 is still missing from the OECD database. Source: Own elaborations from OECD.Stat, MoneyTree Report, CVR Angel Market Activity Reports.
Figure 4. Diagnostic plot of standardized robust residuals versus robust Mahalanobis distance of the vector of covariates from the vector of their means.

Note. The Mahalanobis distance of a multivariate vector $\mathbf{x}$ of $1 \times p$ dimension with mean vector $\mathbf{\mu}$ and covariance matrix $\Sigma$ is defined as: $D(x) = \sqrt{(\mathbf{x} - \mathbf{\mu})^T \Sigma^{-1} (\mathbf{x} - \mathbf{\mu})}$, which follows a chi-squared distribution with $p$ degree of freedom under normality. Observations lying at the right hand side of the vertical limit (set at $\sqrt{X_{p,0.975}^2}$) are defined as good leverage points. Their presence does not affect the OLS-estimation but it affects the statistical inference since they do deflate the estimated standard errors. Observations lying above or below the area delimited by the two horizontal limits (set at -2.25 and +2.25, respectively) are defined as vertical outliers and affect the estimated intercept of an OLS-estimation. Observations lying both at the right hand side of the vertical limit and outside the 95% confidence interval of the Standard Normal are considered bad leverage points. Their presence significantly affects the OLS-estimates of both the intercept and the slope.